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Guatemala's Peace Accords in a Free
Trade Area of the Americas
Gus Van Hartent
Foreign capital will always be welcome as long as it adjusts to local conditions, remains aluays subordinate to Guatemalan laws, cooperates with the economic detelopment of the country, and strictly abstains from intervening in the nation's social and political life.
--Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman
Inaugural address, 19512
L-TRODUCTION
On New Year's Day. 1997, for the first time in nearly four decades. Guatemala was officially "at peace." The last of twelve peace accords 2 had been signed. putting in place a broad mandate for reform to address many of the historical grievances of the country's marginalized and + Law Clerk-Court of Appeal for Ontario. Toronto. Canada. B-A. 1994 . University .--f Guelph= LLB. 1999. Osgoode Hall Law cho-,l: ME.S. 1999-York Uraversit-. I wish to thank Professors Eduardo Canel and Brian Slattery for their guidance and encouragement as well as Susanne Hanm and Carlos Ventura for their editing, moral support, and inspiration. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the benefactors of the Michael Baptista Essay Prize and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA Award program, and thE institutional support Df the Facultad Latioamericana de Ciencias Sociales 4FLACSO-Guatemala) in Guatemala Citv.
1. Cited The thrust of the Article is that an FTAA investment agreementand international investment agreements in general-may be inconsistent with sovereign and democratic decisionmaking at the domestic level. Given that one of their central purposes is to "disciplinegovernments, and thereby protect investors, international investment agreements may provide investors with unwarranted leverage to influence political decisionmaking and thus constrain the scope for governments to pursue national strategies for development and reform. The Guatemalan peace accords provide a compelling example of this phenomenon given the deep resonance that they hold as a symbol of hard-fought democratic negotiation and political compromise by diverse social sectors to end decades of war and violence, itself stemming from extreme political and economic marginalization of popular majorities by a powerful economic elite. Indeed, after decades of conflict, the prospect that the hard-won Government commitments to pursue critical landrelated reforms might be undermined by the threat of investor challenges under an FTAA investment agreement is a cause for serious concern.
In Part I of this Article, I review the recent peace process in Guatemala, suggesting that the peace accords create vital possibilities for reform. primarily through the future election of governments that are more democratically accountable to popular priorities. I also discuss the centrality of land as a source of historic conflict in Guatemala. and, in light of this. summarize the Governments commitments on land under the Indigenous Accord and the Soc io-Economic Accord. In Part H. I locate the proposed FTAA agreement on investment within the broader international "push" to establish higher standards of investor protection in the process of transnationalization. I also review some of the precedents for an FTAA investment agreement. based on bilateral investment treaties, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAIFA).9 and the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MIA), 10 and outline the key principles on which stronger investor protection is based. In Part EEL I assess the potential impact of an FTAA investment agreement on the ability of Guatemalan governments to carrv out the State's commitments on land issues under the peace accords. This assessment relies on an anticipatory analysis of the [Vol. 3:113 arguments that investors might use under an FTAA investor-to-state mechanism to challenge various policies stemming from the peace accords. Finally, I conclude with a short discussion of the significance of the analysis for issues of sovereignty and democratic accountability in Guatemala and elsewhere, and possible popular responses in the case of the FTAA negotiations.
I. GUATEMALAN PEACE ACCORDS
Tens of thousands gathered in Guatemala City's central square to celebrate the signing of the final peace accord between the Guatemalan Government and the country's guerrilla forces, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), on December 29, 1996.11 They rejoiced in the sensation of peace and the expectation of change. During one of the formal signing ceremonies in Oslo, Norway, representatives of different social sectors endorsed the peace accords in pairs: a Mayan campesino walked with a Ladino university student, 12 a trade unionist with a government official, a military officer with a priest. Thus ended thirty-six years of war, and thus began the long process to confront the aftermath of decades of violence and human rights violations 13 organized primarily by the Guatemalan State 14 and targeted most ferociously against the country's majority Mayan population. 15 The violence has left deep physical and emotional scars on millions of Guatemalans who suffered from, or carried out. the atrocities.' 6 As is widely understood, these scars can only begin to be healed by systematically addressing the underlying concerns that prompted and fueled the war.
Negotiations between representatives of the Government and the URNG to end the armed conflict began in 1991. although most of the peace accords were concluded between 1994 and 1996.17 The compromise embodied in the accords is broad in scope, dealing with issues of human rights verification, resettlement of uprooted populations, indigenous rights. socio-economic and agrarian reform, a truth commission, the role of the military in a democratic society. the reintegration of the URNG. a cease-fire, and constitutional reforms. While the conclusion of the Cold War and the support of the international community=-contributed to the end of the conflict, a wide cross-section of Guatemalan society participated in the process leading to the final settlement. Indeed, nongovernmental organizations from every social sector contributed to the negotiations through the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC). which submitted consensus proposals to the negotiating parties. or, in the case of the business sector, through direct links to the Government9
As such, the peace accords are a critical symbol of Guatemala's historic compromise between domestic elites seeking to salvage their guttered international reputation and popular organizations reeling from decades of repression and war.
2 " According to Susanne Jonas. the strategy involved the -mass execution of defenseless children women, elderly people. and refugees by military troops.-CARLOS M. ViLs. BETWEEN EARTHQUAKES AND VOLCANOES 138 (1995) . The Guatemalan Defense Minister at the time announced his intent to -get rid of the words 'indigenous' and "Indian. 
REPORr.
17. The final accord was signed on December 29. 1996. bringing irtually all of the other accords into effect.
18. See, e.g.. Jeremy Armon et al, Contexio Hist6rico, in GUATEMIAL 198.3-1997 GuA-ENLAiA 1983 -1997 . supra-at 4-1-47.
19. The ASC was created pursuant to the negotiated commitment on the part of the Government and the URNG to promote participation in the peace process by -nongovernmental sectors of Guatemalan society of recognized legitimacy, representation and legality.-See P.ALENCIA PRADO & HOLIDAY. supra note 12. at 32-37 (discussing contribution of ASC to negotiation of peace accords).
20. Elite resistance to negotiating an end to the conflict was undermined -less by longterm concerns over democratization than by the -signs of imminent asphyxiation and international isolation--both economic and political-that would be applied to accords represent "a splitting of differences between radically opposed forces, with major concessions from both sides." 21 In the wider context, the peace process brings to an end one of the worst disasters of human conflict and violence in recent Latin American history, 22 and opens a period of tentative hope for greater democratic accountability. The resolution of land issues is central to this process.
A. The Context of the Accords
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The roots of social crisis and conflict in Guatemala lie in the land.
For centuries, the country's economic model, based on producing agricultural exports for wealthy markets abroad, 23 has entailed exploitation of the largely Mayan rural population by a small minority of landowners. The State has actively promoted this "development"
policy by expropriating land from indigenous Mayan communities, guaranteeing a constant supply of cheap human labor for the benefit of large private landowners, 24 and providing low-interest agricultural 6, 6 (1997) .
22. After surveying the literature, the Latin American Weekly Report concluded that the violence in Guatemala generated the largest number of "extra-judicial executions and 'disappearances' anywhere in Latin America by all accounts." Counting the Toll of State Terrorism, LATIN AM. WKLY REP., Jun. 8, 1995, at 249. 23. The agro-export model has expanded and diversified in phases-from an almost exclusive focus on coffee, to include bananas, then cotton, sugar, cardamom, and cattleranching, and, most recently, nontraditional export crops including vegetables, fruits, seeds, and flowers. Between 1956 and 1980 , the total land area devoted to cotton increased by 2,100 percent, to sugar by 400 percent, and to coffee by 56 percent; from 1960 to 1978, grazing lands for cattle expanded by 21 times. See JAMES PAINTER, GUATEMALA: FALSE HOPE, FALSE FREEDOM 3 (1987) ; see also GUILLERMO PEDRONI & ALFONSO PORRES, POLITICAS AGRARIAS, PROGRAMAS DE AcCESO A LA TIERRA Y ESTRATEGIAS DE COMERCIALIZACION CAMPESINA 13-14 (1991) . Most of the funding for government loans to support export vegetables and fruits has been provided by the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, and USMID. See LORI ANN THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVEST FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS 3, 44-45, 58 (1995) . The expansion of snow peas and broccoli has been particularly dramatic. Snow pea production, for instance, rose by 17 times from 1983 to 1991, to a total of 24.6 million pounds. By 1991, Guatemala produced 80 percent of snow peas exported to the U.S. from Mexico and Central America. See id. at 44-45; see also Calogero Carletto et al., Sustainability in the Diffusion of Innovations: Smallholder Nontraditional Agro-Exports in Guatemala, 47 ECON. & CULTURAL CHANGE 345, pt. 1 (1999) .
24. Agro-export production in Guatemala originates in colonial history. Since 1519, Spanish plantations were established by evicting indigenous communities and requiring Indian labor for the cultivation of cacao, indigo, and cochineal. Under the post-colonial Liberal regime of General Justo Rufino Barrios, beginning in 1871, the agro-export economy was more effectively integrated into the global economy by forcibly expanding private land ownership and increasing coffee exports to meet booming demand on the international market. See PEDRONI & PORRES, supra note 23, at 17-18, 41; JIM HANDY, GIFT OF THE DEVIL 21-23 (1984) .
According to Susan Berger, "Contrary to general belief, the Guatemalan state between 1931 and 1991 was a relatively autonomous decisionmaker, and it adopted an aggressive interventionist stance in directing agrarian development." SUSAN A. BERGER, credit and technical assistance exclusively to large landowners.
2 As a result, the agro-export model has generated a skewed distribution of land, with a small number of Guatemalan and foreign investors controlling sprawling plantations while the great majority of rural people struggle to survive on small plots of marginal land, or without any land at all.2 The concentration of land ownership in Guatemala is among the highest in the hemisphere.2 = and the country's economy remains heavily biased toward agro-export production. At the close of 1994, U.N. human rights expert M6nica Pinto reported that the inequitable distribution of land "becomes more acute every day and is not included on either official or political agendas. 33. Small farmers suffer from disadvantages other than lack of physical access to land, such as the absence of a simple, low cost system for land registration and lack of access to technical support and credit. In 1993, for example, 16 percent of credit from the banking system went to finance production of basic grains, while 41 percent went to traditional agro-exports. The most disadvantaged small holders are indigenous women, who do not have legal protection for land ownership and access to credit. See Palma Murga, supra note 28, at 75; HERNANDEZ ALARC6N, supra note 32, at 4.
The primary alternative to agro-export production is the cultivation of indigenous crops for subsistence or small-scale exchange in local markets. Agricultural production in the highlands, in particular, continues to revolve around the traditional Mayan milpa system, which combines cultivation of maize and beans, sometimes complemented by chile, squash and vegetables. See PEDRONI & PORRES, supra note 23, at 12. Speaking generally, the traditional milpa system has been practiced in an ecologically sustainable way for millenia, and has provided "social security" for local communities. It is presently confronted with a range of social, economic and ecological pressures, however. GUATEMALA CITY 8 (1995) .
37. Guatemala can be divided into four topographic regions: the Pacific coastal lowlands, the highlands, the Northern Transversal Strip, and the Petdn. See BERGER, supra note 24, at 6. The Mayan population is concentrated in the northwest highlands, with the population of the highland departments ranging from 80 to 95 percent
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-5 often extending their cornfields far up the steep sides of hills and volcanoes. This squeezing out of small farmers by agro-exports has in turn undermined local food securit":39 it has also contributed to processes of deforestation4o and soil erosion. 41 LIAT,-AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEkN G9'4). As early as 1955, the government was forced to import large quantities of corn to make up for national shortfalls. See BERGER. supra note 24. at S. 89. Since the 1970s. production of crops for domestic consumption has grown by only 2.5 percent, less than the average rate of population growth of 3 percent. See PEDRONI & PORRES. supra note 23. at 11. 13: BERGER. supra note 24. at "-7-89. Between the early 1980, and early 1990s, imports of -food aid" rose by 15 times, while exports of basic cereals more than doubled. See WORLD REsOURCES LNsT. ET AL, WORLD RESOURCES 1996 -97. at 245 tbL 10.4 (1996 . Between 1974 and . moreover, the quantir-of grains fed to livestock as a percentage of total grain consumption rose from 7 to 25 percent. Id. at 243 tbl.104_ Mayan small farmers, increasingly squeezed off their land by larger agro-interests. produce most of Guatemala's basic grains for domestic consumption-including 60 percent of corn. 42 percent of beans, and 31 percent of rice. See PRADO & HOLIDAY. supra note 12, at 53.
40. The country's forest cover is estimated to have fallen from 65 to 34 percent in the last four decades, and the rate of deforestation has apparently been rising;, approximately 90 percent of deforestation is attributed to the colonization of new lands by land-hungry campesinos. See U-NDP. supra note 37. at 103 & n-25. In the highlands. more than 100 communal forests that have been managed and protected by local communities for centuries are under intense pressure. Land-related factors that threaten these forests include over-exploitation, land disputes with neighboring landowners. ambiguity in the definition of property boundaries, lack of community rules and sanctions to guide communal use, lack of land title registration, invasions, and illicit extractions. Such gross inequality in access to, and ownership of, fertile lands has been at the heart of social conflict in Guatemala for centuries, and remains so today. 43 The most significant attempts to address this conflict occurred under the reformist governments of Jos6 Ar6valo and Jacobo Arbenz Guzm~n in the decade from 1944 to 1954, popularly known as the "Ten Years of Spring." 44 In 1952, Arbenz passed an agrarian reform that redistributed underused lands from large plantations to landless campesinos. 45 Such reform, though moderate, invoked the wrath of a number of large landowners and investors in Guatemala, including the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company, the largest landowner in the country at the time, leading in large part to Arbenz's overthrow in a 1954 U.S.-backed military coup. 46 The newly installed government of General Carlos Castillo Armas quickly reversed the agrarian reform and brutally silenced political opposition, 47 giving rise to the Guatemalan guerrilla resistance and ushering in decades of fluctuating waves of popular opposition and repression by the increasingly militarized state. 48 Land reform has been a central demand CENTRAL AMERICA 116 (1987) . The departments with the highest proportion of underused land are located in the agro-export zones along the Pacific coast and in the southeast: Jalapa, Retalhuleu, Suchitep6quez, Escuintla, and Izabal. See UNDP, supra note 37, at 224. 43. In 1995, for example, the U.N. mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA) reported that the land is "an essential factor, if not the most relevant, in the Guatemalan political, economic, social and cultural state of affairs" and that "a fair and economically productive distribution of land might be an indispensable factor for the avoidance of popular disorder and discontent .. " MINUGUA, supra note 25, at 1 (author's translation). With greater flourish, the National Coalition of Campesino Organizations declared in July 1998 that "the unjust distribution of land is the center of all the conflicts that our country has experienced and a limitation for the development of the country .. " Coordinadora Nacional absence of a comprehensive land registry. 53 Speaking generally, the country lacks effective legal mechanisms to resolve conflicting claims to land and, after thirty-six years of violence, the political culture tends toward confrontation rather than compromise. 54
B. The Peace Accords
14
In the face of this historical conflict over land, Guatemala's peace accords follow the path of moderation. 55 Although they do not contemplate a wide-ranging land redistribution, the Government makes significant commitments in the accords to (1) facilitate access to land and encourage the productive use of land, (2) resolve land conflicts and provide security of land tenure, and (3) promote indigenous land rights generally. As such, the implementation of the accords, and the achievement of greater democratic accountability, will depend to a large extent on the degree to which these commitments on agrarian issues are transformed into meaningful reforms that address conditions of land shortage and rural poverty. The fate of the commitments on land, in a very real way, could determine the consolidation of peace in Guatemala.
15
The two most important accords dealing with agrarian reform and indigenous land rights are the Socio-Economic Accord and the Indigenous Accord. 56 Both accords were concluded only after long and difficult negotiations toward a compromise on land. This was especially true in the case of the Socio-Economic Accord, which was concluded, following more than a year of negotiations, only after the removal of sections that were unacceptable to the private sector. 57 The accord was roundly criticized by popular organizations for having given away too much to the other side. 58 In the case of the Indigenous Accord the compromise reached reflects, in part, the moderated position taken by 53. UNIDAD PARA LA PROMOCI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA, OAS, DIAGNOSTICO DE CONFLICTIVIDAD 10-11 (1996) . This preliminary OAS study identifies land as the primary source of conflict in the country, manifested in legal uncertainty about possession, the post-war return of refugees and displaced persons, border disputes involving communities and municipalities, and peasant occupations of plantations. the Assembly for Civil Society (ASC) during the peace negotiations. During the negotiations, the ASC pushed for the recognition of the indigenous right "to possess. use and administer the lands inhabited by the Mayan linguistic communities and those they acquire in the future in accordance with international law," but decided to exclude positions that were perceived as more radical. 5 9 Given the degree of participation and compromise that went into the negotiation of both accords, the commitments on land represent key symbols of the aspirations for democratic accountability, peace, and development in Guatemala.
Under the Socio-Economic Accord, the Guatemalan Government makes various commitments to carry out policies designed to facilitate access to land. encourage the productive use of land. resolve land conflicts, and improve security of land tenure. ' These include commitments regarding a land trust fund to benefit landless and small farmers.
61 a land tax designed to encourage productive use of land, 62 a comprehensive land registry.
6 3 the resolution of land conflictsi 4 the reinstatement of usurped land or compensation of their former owners,65 recognition of communal land ownership,66 and potential redistribution of underused lands under Article 40 of the Constitution.
Under the Indigenous Accord, the Government recognizes -the special importance which their relationship to the land has for the indigenous communities" and commits to undertake broad measures of reform "in order to strengthen the exercise of their collective rights to the land and its natural resources.
--s In particular, the Government makes a range of commitments designed to promote indigenous land rights, including commitments concerning indigenous access to traditional lands.9 indigenous participation in decisionmaking regarding natural resources,' 0 indigenous rights to compensation for damage caused by resource development projects,' the elimination of 59. The ASC proposal was essentially based on the position put forward by the Mayan sector of the ASC. with one important exception related to land: the Mayan demand fir restitution of expropriated communal lands was excluded from the ASC proposal as too radical See PALENCLA PRADO 
See id. pts. IV F(6)(b). IV(E)(3). 71. See id. pt. lV(F)(6)(c).
?000] discrimination against indigenous women with respect to land, 72 and the settlement of indigenous land claims.
73
In summary, based on both accords, the Government commits to: Promote indigenous land rights, including i. Indigenous access to traditional lands for subsistence and spiritual activities; ii. Indigenous rights regarding natural resources on their traditional lands; iii. The elimination of discrimination against indigenous women; iv. Settlement of indigenous land claims.
These commitments are extremely significant in the Guatemalan context given the close connection between land issues and conditions of rural poverty and social conflict. As a whole, the accords point to key areas for reform, achievable through the election of more broadly representative governments, and have made the previously taboo issue of land reform a part of the landscape of public debate and popular organizing. As such, they are powerful symbols of democracy. 75 In terms of implementation to date, the United Nations has reported tentative progress 76 as well as significant setbacks. 77 Although there are no 72. See id. pt. IV(F)(9)(g). 73. See id. pt. IV(F)(7). 74. For further discussion, see infra Part III.
David Holiday comments:
The "war" has not been the defining element of everyday life in Guatemala for at least the last 10 years, and the average Guatemalan does not see that "peace" will bring any radical transformation. Yet it is precisely this sense of alienation by ordinary citizens from the political process that the peace negotiations seek to address. Holiday, supra note 57, at 68.
76. In terms of the successes with respect to land and the agrarian situation, the U.N. has mentioned the progress achieved in negotiations toward a land trust fund, the guarantees that future Guatemalan governments will move forward with the State's commitments.' the accords have at least laid a foundation for meaningful changes to occur within a broader, long-term political process.79 David Holiday suggests that. at best. the peace accords have given Guatemala -its last viable chance to create a national agenda for development and democratization.
" ) It is this sentiment of hope that leads us to the question of how wider processes like the FTAA might impact on the prospects for democratic reform.
creation of the Institutional Commission for the Derelopment and Strengthening of Land
Ownership to coordinate government institutions involved in agricultural issues. and the increased participation of nongovernmental organizations. The U.N. has also given special tribute:
both to the State authorities. .. and to the indigenous and peasant organizations which are responsible for the success of several unprecedented experiments with consultation. This willingness to put one'S faith in negotiation and conciliation or such sensitive issues as inter-ethnic relations and access to land reflects a desire for change which-we hope. will grow stronger and extend to other areas .... S. Indeed. implementation of the peace accords faces resistance from powerful social groups within Guatemala-For an outline of the agricultural, commercial, financial, and industrial elite interests lined up against fundamental reform, see TAYLOR. supra note 11. at 64-68; PALENCL PRADO & HOLIDAY,. supra note 12. at 2--32. High-level military and government officials, for instance, have been linked to the assassination of a leading advocate of human rights and the peace accords. Bishop Juan Gerardi. See The America&:-Another Kind of Reconstruction. THE ECO\OxuST. Nov. 14. 199S, at 36-37.
The election of Alfonso Portillo as President of Guatemala in January 2000 may also not bode well for the mandate of the peace accords, at least in the area of land. Portillo is leader of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). founded by the infamous General Efrain Rios Montt. who held power in the early 1980s, overseeing some of the worst violence against indigenous highland communities, and who now stts in Congress. The FRG has close ties to landowners and it opposed the land tax in 199S. See The America&: Portillos progress. THE ECONOMIST. Jan-22. 2000 . at 3k_-39.
9. See, e-g.. Palma Murga. supra note 28. at 73 (UThe political opening now is real despite many obstacles ... '-(author7S translation): Jonas, supra note 21. at 10 ("[On the positive side of the balance sheet, the peace process and the Accords have laid the basis for completing the country's long-interrupted democratic revolution-.
80. Holiday, supra note 57. at 74. The FTAA governments formed a working group to study the topic in 1994,84 and created a negotiating group on investment, which held its fourth meeting in August 1999. Their work continues toward concluding a hemispheric agreement on investment.
II. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
A. The "Push"for Stronger Investor Protection
Context for the "push"
21
The FTAA investment negotiations are part of a wider effort to establish higher standards of protection for investors at the 84. An FTAA working group on investment was formed at the first trade ministerial meeting in Denver, Colorado in June 1995. See Summit of the Americas Trade Ministerial: Denver Ministerial Declaration, Jun. 30, 1995, para. 5, available at <http://www.alca-ftaa. org/ministerials/denvere.asp>. In March 1998, the national trade ministers of the FTAA governments declared their intent: "To establish a fair and transparent legal framework to promote investment through the creation of a stable and predictable environment that protects the investor, his investment and related flows, without creating obstacles to investments from outside the hemisphere. 89. Prior to World War IL most international investment was portfolio investment. involving foreign ownership of assets in a country without foreign control of productive enterprises. With the rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the post-war era, however. FDI has become the dominant form of international investment. FDI is defined as:
an investment involving a long term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident rise of transnational corporations (TNCs),90 and the ideological preeminence of neoliberalism, 9 1 or, the 'Washington Consensus." 92 As such, the neoliberal "globalization project" aims to liberalize investment rules in order to support the trend toward the dismantling of government policies to regulate FDI, and the consequent unfettering of TNCs. In ideological terms, the push for higher standards has been framed as an effort to establish a stable, predictable and transparent framework for international investment, to reduce investor uncertainty, and to facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital across borders. 93 in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). Foreign direct investment implies that the investor exerts a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other economy. UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 219. FDI is distinct because it entails foreign control over the location and management of assets within a country. Control may be exercised through direct ownership, or through decisions about the management and financing of operations, the use of technology, and so on. In the case of agro-export production, for instance, TNCs frequently control the financing, marketing, processing, and distribution of products while production remains in the hands of local growers. See GILL & LAW, supra note 85, at 146-47; UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 219; BARRY, supra note 39, at 29.
Governments, especially in developing countries, expanded their policies to regulate FDI during the 1970s. Since the 1980s, however, governments have dismantled many of these policies. See UNCTC, supra note 87, at 8; UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 133. This trend indicates that governments have adjusted "national policies and practices'... to the exigencies of the world economy of international production." ROBERT W. COX, PRODUCTION, POWER, AND WORLD ORDER 253 (1987) .
Governments have also engaged in "policy competition" with each other to provide favorable conditions for investment by TNCs. See UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 163. This has prompted governments to provide more favorable corporate tax rates, tax holidays, direct subsidies, and other incentives "because of competition from other investment locations." UNCTC, supra note 87, at 8-9. In this context, governments have also allowed TNCs to outgrow their national boundaries by lowering barriers to investment flows out of the country. See Andrew Jackson, The MALI and Foreign Direct Investment, in DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY 250 (Andrew Jackson & Mathew Sanger eds., 1998 175-79 (1995) .
93. Thus, the purpose of the proposed MAI, according to one trade lawyer, was "to reduce or eliminate obstacles to foreign investment, open markets, eliminate discriminatory treatment (both before and after establishment), reduce 'country risk ' and 
2000]
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Alternatively, perhaps, it may be regarded as a part of the effort by capital-exporting countries to support the global business strategies of large TNCs., -U.S. capital occupies a preeminent position in the Americas, and this forms an important part of the context for the FTA_A.
9 5 Under an FTTAA higher legal standards of investor protection would presumably provide greater security and leverage for U.S.-based TNCs, which invest heavily in the region. 9 6 It is worth recalling that the U.S. has clashed with Latin American countries over investor protection in the past, and the U.S. Government has responded by exerting its economic and military might to protect the claims of American investors in reallocate capital to its most productive uses. 99. The historical U.S. position has been that state expropriations of foreign property are unlawful under international law unless they meet rigorous conditions, including the payment of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. Latin American countries, on the other hand, have asserted that foreign property is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the government of the host country, which may determine how compensation for an expropriation is to be assessed and paid. 100. The following is adopted from a summary provided in UNCTAD, supra note 86,
20
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" expanding notions of national treatment (by means of an effects test and a right of establishment, for example), * prohibiting performance requirements imposed by governments.
" broadening definitions of expropriation and compensation, * creating an enforceable investor-to-state dispute resolution mechanism, * providing for -rollback-of exceptions to the agreement.
* providing for "standstill" regarding future government measures, and * establishing a much longer "lock-in-period.
In essence, all of these elements of the push for higher standards of investor protection have the corresponding effect of expanding and deepening existing legal restraints on the ability of governments to regulate investors. As such, the higher standards may be contrasted with more conventional principles of international investment law in terms of the degree to which they constrain government policymaking authority. Below, I briefly describe each of the expanded investor standards, contrasting them with the more conventional principle they aspire to replace.
i. Effects Test
The conventional trade principle of national treatment requires that a government treat foreign investors no less favorably than it treats at 162.
101. To illustrate. investment-has been variably defined under conventional investment agreements to include such assets as movable and immovable property rights. equity in companies. claims to money and contractual rights. copyrights and industrial domestic persons or companies.
102 Government policies that favor domestic actors-by, for example, giving them exclusive benefits or preferred treatment-are said to be "discriminatory" against foreign investors, and may be attacked under conventional principles of international investment law. An effects test expands upon national treatment by requiring not only that a government not purposely exclude foreign investors from benefits conferred upon nationals, but that it also not implement any policy or measure that has any indirect effects on foreign investors that are not equally felt by nationals.
103
Thus, even a facially neutral policy that evinces no intent to confer any distinct benefit may be open to attack under the expanded investor standards if, because of circumstances unique to a given country or foreign investor, it disadvantages a foreign investor vis-a-vis domestic persons or companies.
ii. Right of Establishment 1 0 4
27
International investment treaties have, in the past, tended to limit the application of national treatment to the post-establishment phase of an investment. That is, a foreign investor would be guaranteed nondiscriminatory treatment only after it was allowed into the host country, in accordance with the country's laws and regulations. 05 A right of establishment in effect applies national treatment to the entry and establishment phases of an investment. As such, it requires a government to allow foreign investors to enter its domestic market without restriction. This right would normally be subject to certain exceptions; in absolute terms, however, governments would be required to allow one hundred percent foreign access and ownership in every economic sector. Any barrier to free foreign access and ownership in the domestic economy would potentially be open to an investor attack.
iii. Uniform National Treatment
28
The principle of uniform national treatment expands conventional national treatment by requiring that foreign investors be treated uniformly by all regulatory entities within a nation's borders. Thus, it would be a violation of national treatment for subnational governments (i.e. local, provincial, state, territorial) to provide varying standards of treatment within a country. In some cases, foreign investors might be entitled to the best subnational treatment available, no matter where in 104. The principle may also be referred to as "market access" or "freedom of entry." 105. See Ganesan, supra note 94, at 17.
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iv. Prohibition on Performance Requirements
As sovereigns, governments often leverage their ability to deny entry to foreign investors in order to extract investment commitments for the benefit of local development needs. Heightened standards of investor protection. however, exclude this possibility. A prohibition on performance requirements, for example, prevents a government from requiring foreign investors to hire local employees, use local resources, transfer technology, develop local utilities and services, etc., as a condition of an investment or of eligibility for investment incentives.
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This, in effect, makes domestic governments passive receivers, rather than active negotiators. of the externalities-both positive and negative-of foreign investor undertakings within their jurisdictions.
v. Expanded Notions of Expropriation and Compensation
Under conventional notions of expropriation and compensation, foreign investors are protected from expropriation or nationalization of their assets by the host state. In the past, however, the principle has been limited by narrowing the definitions of "-investment," "'expropriation, and "compensation."ic' Expanded notions of expropriation and compensation, by contrast, protect investors from government policies that are "tantamount to . . . 110. The government obligation to pay compensation can also be expanded by widening the definition of investment to include intellectual property rights. portfolio investment, or "all tangible and intangible property." The preliminary definition of investment proposed under the draft MAT is particularly broad:
vi. Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution
31
Heightened standards of investor protection also change the way investors may challenge government policies that act to their detriment. Under conventional mechanisms, known as state-to-state dispute settlement, an investor whose rights have been violated must appeal to its home government, which then has the option to pursue enforcement of the investor's rights with the host government by diplomatic or other means on the investor's behalf.
11 Heightened standards, by contrast, allow the foreign investor to claim compensation directly from the host government before an international arbitration panel. The investor-to-state dispute resolution greatly increases the ability of foreign investors to directly influence host governments by threatening suit for injunctive relief and substantial compensatory damages in the absence of the sovereign immunity protections normally ensured by domestic courts. 112. Singer and Orbuch comment that the draft MAI provisions on investor-to-state dispute settlement would "create rights that are not now available to foreign investors through American statutes or case law." Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102, pts. I, III(C)(1).
vii. Standstill and Rollback Provisions
113. General exceptions are negotiated to remove broad areas of government lawmaking authority from the rules of an agreement for all country-members. Countryspecific reservations are negotiated to remove more specific areas of government lawmaking authority from the rules of an agreement for a particular country-member. for other multilateral investment negotiations. 121 Although the NAFTA deals with a range of legal and economic issues, its provisions on investment are considered especially significant. 122 The NAFTA sets high standards of investor protection by expanding the definitions of investment and investor, granting a right of establishment in some sectors, and prohibiting performance requirements. 123 Perhaps most importantly, the NAFTA expands on standards of expropriation and compensation, and allows investors to directly challenge government policies under an investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism. 
Multilateral Investment Agreements
35
The push for higher standards has also manifested itself at the multilateral level. Although no comprehensive world agreement on investment has yet been established, the issue has been "prominent on the international policy agenda" for a number of years, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 125 During the Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations, the U.S. presented an ambitious proposal for a multilateral investment agreement that was 121. As commentators have noted, "NAFTA set a precedent for the treatment of performance requirements" that was adopted in proposals for an MAI. Representative, for example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency "is playing a larger role than might previously have been the case" in U.S. preparations for FTAA negotiations "because of the agency's concern over an individual government's right to issue regulations without crossing over into an expropriation dispute." 130 The comments suggest apprehension on the part of the EPA about the impact of high investment standards on the ability of governments to regulate environmental matters. More broadly, the strong public opposition to the MAI that has arisen in North America and elsewhere, as well as events surrounding the recent Seattle ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization, may signal rough waters ahead for future FTAA talks.
On the other hand, there remains a powerful momentum behind the push for stronger investor protection. The U.S. Government, in particular, has forcefully advanced the NAFTA investment provisions as a prototype for the FTAA.131 Canada and Mexico have also reportedly pushed for higher standards since committing to NAFTA.132 Investors themselves have organized to support higher standards, holding annual business forums alongside FTAA government meetings, for example. On the whole, therefore, there is good reason to expect that the FTAA investment negotiations may lead to the establishment of higher standards of investor protection in the Americas, modeled after NAFTA, or perhaps the draft MAI.
D. Investor-to-State Mechanism: Leveraging Democratic Accountability
The NAFTA investment provisions, contained in Chapter 11 of the agreement, provide an important, if tentative, example of how higher standards of investor protection have impacted government decisionmaking. The NAFTA was the first multilateral agreement to create an investor-to-state mechanism, described as "an untapped source of extensive private-investor rights, including guaranteed access 
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Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2000] , Iss. 1, Art. 3 https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol3/iss1/3 to a NAFTA panel for a private party." 133 Under Chapter 11, an investor may avoid domestic courts, and thus sovereign immunity issues, by directly challenging a government before a NAFTA arbitration panel, where consent of the home country is not needed. 134 Chapter 11 disputes are heard and resolved by international arbitration panels, made up of experts in fields like international commerce, finance, industry, and law. 135 Perhaps most significantly, NAFTA panel decisions are insulated from judicial review in domestic courts. 136
The great portent of the investor-to-state mechanism is that it allows individual investors to launch their own international legal claims against states. According to one international arbitration lawyer, Cheri Eklund, Chapter 11 represents "a remarkable step" since it "transfers control over the incidence and conduct of investor disputes from the [NAFTA] Parties to private persons."' 1 7 Eklund suggests that the rules are so favorable to investors that it is "inconceivable that an investor would elect to litigate a Chapter Eleven dispute before a national court." 138 These comments reveal the potential that exists for investors to apply Chapter 11, or a similar FTAA mechanism, to advance their positions in new ways vis--vis domestic governments.
How have investors applied these new rights? To date, at least 40 thirteen NAFTA lawsuits have been initiated in response to a diverse range of government policies in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. The impugned policies have included a phase-out of a gasoline additive, a ban on exports of PCBs, the creation of an ecological preserve, a jury damages award, a bilateral agreement on softwood lumber exports, a mall deal gone bad, a banana gasoline additive, and a moratorium on water exports. 139 In each case, investors have argued that the policies violated the investment principles established under NAFTA, and that they were entitled to direct state compensation for the harm suffered. 140
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The full significance of the NAFTA investor-to-state mechanism has been the subject of great debate. Critics claim that Chapter 11 gives investors unwarranted leverage over political decisionmaking, allowing them to interfere with the ability of elected governments to implement legitimate public policies.141 They have warned of a "chill effect" on government policymakers faced with the threat of an investor challenge. 142 Other commentators counter that the breadth of the NAFTA investment provisions is in fact much more narrow, and that NAFTA panels will respect the legitimate authority of governments. 140. Only one of the investor challenges has actually been decided by a NAFTA arbitration panel, and that challenge was dismissed on both the facts before the panel and on a "credibility gap" that adhered to DESONA, the investor making the claim. The challenge involved a decision by municipal authorities to revoke a permit allowing DESONA to pick up waste in a Mexico City suburb. 143. To illustrate the debate: in hearings on the FTAA before a Canadian Parliamentary subcommittee, two trade law experts took rather divergent positions on the potential impact of Chapter 11. On the one hand, law professor Robert Howse commented that investor claims to date "arise out of an unreasonable or, to put it charitably, very speculative interpretation of the legal language of NAFTA" and that there is no "accepted definition of expropriation or taking of property just because some business loses revenues due to the government changing some general public policy." On the other hand, trade lawyer Howard Mann argued that Chapter 11 has become "an offensive weapon, a lobbying weapon, a strategic tool that any form of corporation has virtually unfettered access to" in order "to challenge public policy making, public regulation making, and public welfare activity in the normal course of government .... "
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Indeed, much of the legal language is broadly-drafted and unprecedented in international law, and thus awaits interpretation by NAFTA panels on a case-by-case basis.1 44 The bottom line appears to be that the implications of the NAFTA investment provisions will remain uncertain for years to come, and may potentially be revolutionary from a legal point of view.'
45
Of course, this uncertainty has not prevented investors from using
42
Chapter 11 to challenge government policies. In some cases, the mere threat of a lawsuit has reportedly caused governments to reconsider proposed policies. 46 In one prominent case of an actual NAFTA lawsuit, a U.S.-based company sued the Canadian government after it banned the import and inter-provincial sale of a gasoline additive manufactured by the company. The Canadian government settled the claim by agreeing to drop its ban, pay a multi-million dollar damage settlement, and issue a public statement disclaiming its previous finding that the additive was a threat to the environment and human health. 145. With reference to the MAI investor-to-state mechanism, Stumberg notes that "none of us today can predict how the MAI dispute panels are going to resolve disputes about the agreement.... What we can say is that ... the law in question will be the MAI text and international law . . . not the constitutional law of your country." BC Special Comm., supra note 141, pt. II (testimony of Robert Stumberg).
146. Foreign investors have reportedly threatened Chapter 11 lawsuits in opposition to government policies, and, in a number of such cases, the policies were subsequently altered or abandoned. The reported cases include proposals for public auto insurance, mandatory plain cigarette packaging, restrictions on advertising in split-run magazines, and renegotiation of an airport privatization contract. See MAI THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 141, at 42; Bruce Campbell, Free Trade: Year 3, 26 CANADIAN DIMENSION 5, 7 (1992) ; House of Commons Testimony, supra note 143.
147. The Government of Canada agreed last year to settle a US$250 million NAFTA lawsuit launched by Ethyl Corporation, based in Richmond, Virginia. Ethyl had challenged Canada under Chapter 11 after the federal government banned the import or inter-provincial sale of the gasoline additive MMT, which is manufactured by the company. The Canadian Government claimed at the time that MMT was an environmental hazard because it gums up automobile emission controls. Ethyl responded with an investor challenge under NAFTA, seeking compensation for, among other claims, lost profits, damage to its assets and loss of the value expropriation of its assets, and damage to its reputation. Under the settlement, the Government agreed to drop its MMT ban, pay Ethyl $19 million for legal costs and lost profits, and issue a public statement that the gasoline additive is not a threat to the environment or human health. In return, Ethyl agreed to drop the NAFTA challenge. Since the settlement, Canada has reportedly despite the uncertainty surrounding the full significance of Chapter 11, trade negotiators from the OECD governments proposed an expanded investor-to-state mechanism under the MAI. The same may occur in the FTAA negotiations, although this will likely depend on how the panel interpretations of Chapter 11 unfold in the investor challenges initiated to date. On the whole, there is a real prospect that the FTAA governments will conclude an agreement on investment, and that its impact will be to enhance foreign investors' ability to influence a gamut of domestic policy issues, by means of strategic reference to the threat of an investor-to-state challenge.
III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AN FTAA ON THE GUATEMALAN PEACE PROCESS
43
Despite the centrality of land in the Guatemalan context, prospective Government policies on agrarian reform, stemming from the peace accords, could run afoul of high standards of investor protection under an FTAA investment agreement. In particular, an investor could challenge the policies, and demand compensation for its losses, on the grounds that they violate broad notions of national treatment, prohibitions on performance requirements, and protections from expropriation. Potentially, then, the FTAA could serve to derail the Guatemalan peace process by constraining the ability of the government to fulfill its commitments under the accords.
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This section aims to demonstrate the rationale behind this forecast of potential conflict, and the types of arguments that an investor could use to challenge various Government policies undertaken pursuant to the peace accords. In particular, it explores some of the arguments that an investor could make in challenging Government policies on land stemming from the accords. Other commentators have attempted to anticipate the impact of proposed investment agreements in this way, especially in the case of the draft MAI.14s The analysis in this Article is modeled, in particular, on the approach adopted in a 1997 report on the MAI prepared for the U.S. Western Governors' Association (WGA). According to the authors of the WGA report:
Our approach is to rely not only on the stated intent of MAI negotiators, but to anticipate how the language of MAI 
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Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2000] , Iss. 1, Art. 3 https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol3/iss1/3 proposals might be interpreted by future dispute panels or courts in response to legal claims brought by investors. This approach is necessary because a core purpose of the MAI is to legally empower investors to seek their own remedies and make their own arguments against state laws without mediation by their home governments. 149 I note that the analysis here is based on a number of critical 45 assumptions about the FTAA. For one, it assumes that an FTAA would establish high standards of investor treatment and protection, modeled after the NAFTA and the draft MAI. In other words, the analysis assumes that an FTAA would include broad definitions of investment and investor, an investor right of establishment, a prohibition on performance requirements, broad notions of expropriation and compensation, and an investor-to-state mechanism. The analysis also assumes that an FTAA investment agreement would apply to the Guatemalan peace accords without any exceptions.1 50 Finally, I note that the aim of the analysis is to provide some examples, rather than an exhaustive review, of prospective investor challenges to Government policies concerning land issues. For this reason, the Article provides only a tentative tip-of-the-iceberg assessment of the potential impact of an FTAA investment agreement. Clearly, actual investor arguments would be driven by the particular facts of a given investor-state dispute, including the specific structure of the impugned government policy.
It is also important to point out that Guatemalan citizens and 46 companies might also be able qualify as foreign investors under an FTAA investor-to-state mechanism and thereby gain the right to challenge their own government for violations of FTAA standards. A Guatemalan citizen might gain access to the investor-to-state mechanism, for instance, by obtaining ownership interests in a foreign 149. Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102, pt. IV. 150. It is conceivable that an FTAA investment agreement could contain exceptions that shelter some areas of government policy from the impact of high standards of investor protection. For example, the agreement might apply the standard of national treatment only in the post-establishment phases of an investment, and thus not create a right of establishment. More significantly, the agreement might state explicitly and broadly that its provisions do not apply to any government policies designed to implement commitments under the peace accords. Alternatively, the agreement might include a general exception to shelter all government policies dealing with land reform (for example) from the impact of the agreement. Finally, the agreement might permit Guatemala to claim specific reservations for certain commitments under the peace accords. For discussion of various forms of exceptions, see SELA, supra note 121, pt. III(B)(2); UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 184.
In all of these cases, the relevant wording in the agreement would be critical since exceptions tend to be interpreted narrowly by dispute resolution bodies. Also, an exception might still permit investors to challenge government policies under an investorto-state provision, or place the onus on governments to establish that a policy fell within an excepted area. Further, any exceptions in an FTAA investment agreement might be limited by "standstill" or "rollback" provisions. See generally UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 194; Ganesan, supra note 94, at 17-18. company operating in Guatemala. In order to qualify as a "foreign" investor, an astute Guatemalan landowner might form a corporation in the U.S. (or another FTAA country), with himself as the controlling shareholder, and transfer ownership of his assets to the foreign corporation. Alternatively, a Guatemalan investor could arrange for joint ownership, with a foreign investor, of its local assets. These options, as well as other innovative legal strategies, could provide Guatemalan investors with access to an FTAA investor-to-state mechanism, in order to challenge the policies of their home government. 151
The following analysis considers how investors could potentially challenge each of the government commitments on land considered in Part I(B), including specific policies to facilitate access to land and encourage its productive use; to resolve land conflicts and provide security of land tenure; and to promote indigenous land rights.
A. Policies to Facilitate Access to Land and Encourage Productive Use
of Land
Land Trust Fund
48
Under the Socio-Economic Accord, the Guatemalan Government agrees to create a land trust fund designed to facilitate campesino access to land.
152 This commitment took further shape in July 1997, when the Joint Commission on Indigenous Land Rights, formed under the Indigenous Accord, 153 submitted a detailed bill to Congress proposing a law to establish a land trust fund. The proposed fund was designed to benefit campesinos without land, campesinos living in poverty, and campesinos with insufficient land based on criteria of the size and soil quality of land owned, relative to basic family needs.
54
Eligibility would be further restricted to "Guatemalans"; consequently,
151. I acknowledge that some of these scenarios may not be probable, although they are certainly possible. All of them would of course depend on the wording and interpretation of the agreement. 152. In particular, the Government commits to "[e]stablish a land trust fund... to provide credit and to promote savings, preferably among micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises. The land trust fund will have prime responsibility for the acquisition of land through Government funding." Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, art. 34(a).
153. The Joint Commission was created under the Indigenous Accord "to study, devise and propose appropriate institutional arrangements and procedures" to carry out the commitments on land rights in the accord. It is made up of an equal number of representatives from Government and indigenous organizations, and adopts its conclusions by consensus. See Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pts. IV(F)(10), V(a), V(d).
154. See Anteproyecto de Ley del Fondo de Tierras, presentado por la Comisi6n Paritaria sobre Derechos Relativos a la Tierra de los Pueblos Indigenas al Congreso de la Repiblica de Guatemala [Land Fund Law Bill, presented potentially challenge the establishment of the proposed land trust fund by arguing that it is a violation of national treatment to limit eligibility to Guatemalans. As such, the investors could argue that foreign investors suffer discrimination because they are denied benefits made available to their domestic counterparts, and are entitled to compensation from the Government for losses stemming from this discriminatory treatment.
Redistribution of Undeveloped Lands
Under the proposals for a land trust fund, the Government is 50 authorized to facilitate access to land by redistributing undeveloped land that it has acquired under Article 40 of the Guatemalan Constitution. Article 40 provides that "[i]n concrete cases, private property may be expropriated for reasons of collective utility, social benefit or public interest, duly proven. .... 156 Thus, under the peace accords, the Government has the power to expropriate undeveloped private land in order to redistribute it to landless and land poor campesinos.
If the Government acted on its powers under Article 40 to claim undeveloped lands for redistribution, an investor whose assets were diminished in value as a result of the expropriation could argue that it is entitled to compensation. Under broadened definitions of expropriation and compensation, such compensation might be found to include the lost value of the land itself in cases where the investor owned the land directly. It might also include the lost value of agribusiness contracts breached by local producers who owned the land. Finally, it might include the lost value of rights granted to a foreign investor under a previous concession, license or permit to exploit natural resources on the expropriated lands. In each of these cases, the investor could also argue that compensation includes the lost value of the investor's opportunities for future profit. Even the threat of bringing such a potentially bankrupting claim before an arbitration panel would likely be enough to dissuade a state from exercising its constitutional powers to fulfill its land commitments under the peace accords.
Land Tax
The Government further agrees under the Socio-Economic Accord to 52 establish a land tax designed to encourage the productive use of land by taxing undeveloped and under-utilized lands that are over a certain size 155. Joint Commission Proposal, supra note 154, art. 21. 156. GUATE. CONST. art. 40 (author's translation) .
at a higher rate of taxation. 157
A foreign investor might challenge the imposition of such a tax under the principles of national treatment, particularly as broadened by the effects test. Under national treatment, a land tax could not apply higher levies to foreign investors; this would constitute direct discrimination against foreign investors in violation of conventional international investment law. More broadly, a foreign investor could argue that a land tax directed at large-landowners might have indirect discriminatory effects and thereby violate expanded notions of national treatment. To illustrate, a land tax designed to encourage productive use of arable land would likely apply higher rates of taxation to large plantations or underused lands. These modes of land ownership tend to be prevalent in the agro-export sector, where foreign investors are, in many cases, more likely to own land or do business. As a result, a land tax targeting these lands would have a disproportionate and therefore discriminatory effect on foreign investors, and thus violate broad notions of national treatment.
5Finally, the FTAA might not exempt taxation from provisions on expropriation.
158 If no exemption were made, the Government might have to pay compensation to an investor for increasing the tax rate on the investor's assets. In essence, this would make foreign investors immune from certain types of tax hikes, since a government would have to pay back any additional tax revenue as compensation for the expropriation. 
B. Policies to Resolve Land Conflicts and Provide Security of Land Tenure
Land Registry
Under the Socio-Economic Accord, the Government commits to regulate land ownership by creating a comprehensive land registry, described as "a juridical framework governing land ownership that is 157. See Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, art. 42 (providing that the Government will promote "the legislation and mechanisms for the application ... of a land tax in the rural areas ....
The tax, from which small properties will be exempt, will help to discourage ownership of undeveloped land and underutilization of land").
158. Regarding the MAI provisions on expropriation, most country delegations supported inclusion of the following additional statement in the Interpretive Note to the agreement: '"AT Parties understand that no taxation measures of the Parties effective at the time of signature of the Agreement could be considered as expropriatory or having the equivalent effect of expropriation." Some delegations were not in a position to associate themselves with such a statement, however. See MAI COMMENTARY, supra note 114, pt.
VIII (1) In the process of resolving land conflicts and developing a land 56 registry, the Government might be forced to make a determination of ownership amidst conflicting claims. If a determination worked against a foreign investor, the investor could argue that the criteria used to resolve competing claims to land ownership was discriminatory. In so doing, the investor would have to demonstrate that the criteria created some direct or indirect advantage for Guatemalans. This might occur, for example, if the criteria gave preference to historical claims to the land over more recent claims, since investors are probably less likely than Guatemalans to hold long-standing historical claims to disputed lands. Finally, an investor could argue that an unfavorable resolution of a land dispute was "tantamount to expropriation" if the resolution of the dispute caused a reduction in the value of the investor's assets connected to the land area in question.
Communal Land Ownership
The Government commits under the Indigenous Accord to 57 "regularize the legal situation with regard to the communal possession of lands by communities that do not have the title deeds to those lands" including "measures to award title to municipal or national lands with a clear communal tradition. ' 162 The Government further commits under the Socio-Economic Accord to "[p]rotect common and municipal land, in particular by limiting to a strict minimum the cases in which it can be transferred or handed over in whatever form to private individuals. "' 163 One might assume that only Guatemalan communities, and 58 primarily Mayan communities, would be in a position to demonstrate the "clear communal tradition" required for recognition of communal land ownership. If so, the benefits of a Government policy to recognize communal land ownership would flow disproportionately (or exclusively) to Guatemalans. An investor could argue that this effectively discriminates against foreign investors and violates national treatment.
In addition, the Government might restrict the entitlement of so private individuals to own common and municipal land. This could be 160. Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, para. 37(a). The Accord further provides that "the Government undertakes to promote legislative changes that would make it possible to establish an efficient decentralized multi-user land registry system .... Likewise, the Government undertakes to initiate .. .the process of land surveying and systematizing the land register information." Id. para. 38.
161. Id. para. 37(f). 162. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(5) (emphasis added). 163. Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, para. 37(d).
challenged by a foreign investor as a violation of the right of establishment since investors would be prevented from owning (and establishing themselves to do business on) common and municipal land. In such cases, an investor could claim compensation for the lost profit it would otherwise have gained if permitted to own common and municipal land without restriction.
Reinstatement or Compensation for Usurped Lands
60
The Government further commits under the Socio-Economic Accord to reinstate lands or compensate their former owners in cases where the land "has been usurped or has been allocated in an irregular or unjustified manner involving abuse of authority."' 164
61
An investor could challenge this intervention if the Government reinstated usurped land that the investor had come to own. For example, land usurped by a large Guatemalan landowner during the conflict of the 1980s might have been sold or transferred to a foreign investor. Indeed, the land might have been transferred by a Guatemalan landowner to a foreign corporation owned by the landowner, thus potentially qualifying him as a foreign investor. In either case, the investor could demand Government payment to compensate for the value of the usurped land that has been restored to its former owners.
C. Policies to Promote and Protect Indigenous Land Rights
Indigenous Access to Traditional Lands
62
In terms of indigenous rights to land, the Government commits under the Indigenous Accord to recognize and guarantee: the right of access to lands and resources which are not occupied exclusively by communities but to which the latter have historically had access for their traditional activities and their subsistence (rights of way, such as passage, wood-cutting, access to springs, etc., and use of natural resources) and for their spiritual activities. proposed that indigenous sacred sites should be "carved out" of lands delivered under the land trust fund, and held in public ownership.
1 67 In cases where the Government granted special indigenous rights of access to portions of an investor's land, the investor could argue that it is entitled to compensation on the basis that such access is "tantamount to expropriation" of the land. Thus, if an indigenous sacred site was "carved out" of an investor's land to guarantee indigenous access to the site, the investor might be entitled to compensation for the lost value of the land "carved out." Again, the mere threat of investor challenges over such issues is likely to deter government attempts to fulfill its commitments under the two land-related accords.
Indigenous Rights over Natural Resources
Under the Indigenous Accord, the Government further commits to "[r]ecognize and guarantee the right of communities to participate in the use, administration and conservation of the natural resources existing in their lands."
168 To carry out these commitments, the Government might grant a degree of authority over local natural resources to the local community. In such cases, an investor could argue that the local community is a form of subnational government, and is thus bound by the same standards of investor treatment and protection as other levels of Guatemalan government. Similarly, the investor could argue that the "customary norms" of indigenous communities are also bound by the same restrictions, since they are given legal force by the 166. An exception for the Sami indigenous people regarding the local use of resources by indigenous peoples was proposed by the Scandinavian countries in negotiations towards the MAI. The exception proposed that "exclusive rights to reindeer husbandry within traditional Sami areas may be granted to the Sami people" and that the exception "may be extended to take account of any further development of exclusive Sami rights linked to their traditional means of livelihood." See Draft MAI, supra note 10, Annex I, at 133; see also Ovide Mercredi, The MI and the First Nations, in DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY, supra note 89, at 78, 82.
167. See Joint Commission Proposal, supra note 154, art. 39, which provides: When with respect to the plantations acquired by means of the mechanism of the Lands Fund it is determined and recognized, by the indigenous communities neighboring the plantation, that traditional places exist for ceremonial purposes, the segment of land where the ceremonial place is located will be detached from the plantation ....
Id. (author's translation).
168. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(6)(b). The Government also commits under the Socio-Economic Accord "to regulate participation by communities in order to ensure that it is they who take the decisions relating to their land." Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, para. 37(e). Further, the Government commits under the Indigenous Accord to promote legal recognition of "the right of indigenous communities to manage their own internal affairs in accordance with their customary norms provided that the latter are not incompatible with the fundamental rights defined by the national legal system or with internationally recognized human rights." Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(E)(3). authority residing in Guatemalan national or subnational governments. If the policies of a community violated the standards of investor treatment and protection contained in an investment agreement, an investor could argue that either the community itself or the national government must pay compensation.
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The Government also commits under the Indigenous Accord to recognize indigenous rights to approve "any project for the exploitation of natural resources which might affect the subsistence and way of life of the communities" and to receive "fair compensation for any loss which they may suffer as a result of these activities." 169 In light of these provisions, it is possible that a community might restrict participation in resource development projects on local lands to members of the community, so as to retain some of the economic benefits of the project within the community. An investor could challenge this restriction as a violation of national treatment, since it discriminates in favor of members of the community, and against foreign investors. The investor could also challenge the restriction as a violation of the right of establishment, if the investor was effectively barred from establishing operations in the local community.
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Additionally, a community might go so far as to reject a proposal for a resource development project. If an investor had received previous approval for the project from another level of government, such as a concession, license, or permit to exploit natural resources, the investor could claim compensation for the expropriation of the lost business opportunity.
68
Finally, given an FTAA prohibition on performance requirements, investors would be protected from community requirements that the investor hire a certain proportion of local employees, process resources locally, or do business with local enterprises, as conditions of investment.
Affirmative Action for Indigenous Women
69
The Government also commits under the Indigenous Accord to "[e]liminate any form of discrimination against women, in fact or in law, with regard to facilitating access to land .
,,170 This could conceivably be interpreted as a mandate for affirmative action programs to make up for the historical disadvantage faced by indigenous women in terms of land ownership and access to land.
70
give preference to indigenous women in its hiring or contracting decisions is a prohibited performance requirement.171
Indigenous Land Claims Settlements
Under the Indigenous Accord, the Government further recognizes "the particularly vulnerable situation of the indigenous communities, which have historically been the victims of land plundering" and commits "to institute proceedings to settle the claims to communal lands formulated by the communities and to restore or pay compensation for those lands." 173 An investor could also claim compensation if the resolution of an indigenous land claim prevented or delayed the investor in its efforts to carry out a planned resource development project.
The Indigenous Accord includes a wide range of other Government 73 commitments to promote indigenous linguistic, cultural, civil, political, social, and economic rights. 174 An investor could challenge the preferential treatment for indigenous people that is inherent in the recognition and protection of indigenous rights, arguing that it discriminates against (non-indigenous) foreign investors, and thus violates national treatment.
175
171. Under NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the United States reserved "the right to adopt or maintain any measure according rights or preferences to socially or economically disadvantaged minorities" from the impact of national treatment and the prohibition on performance requirements. See NAFTA, supra note 9, 32 I.L.M. at 749, 754, 756-57. 172. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(7). The Government will further promote measures "to ensure recognition, the awarding of title, protection, recovery, restitution and compensation for those rights." Id. pt. IV(F)(1). 173. In terms of the aboriginal land claims process in Canada, the Government of British Columbia stated in a 1997 submission on the MAI:
To take a current, complex and highly sensitive issue-if the settlement of an Aboriginal land claim involves depriving third parties of property interests covered under the broad MAI definition, then, if that third party is a foreign-affiliated investor, it could seek full compensation under the investor-state provisions of the MAI .... Consequently, the MAI could expose governments to increased costs and, by providing foreign-affiliated investors with a unilateral option to go to binding international arbitration, could adversely change the dynamics of land claim settlement negotiations. Gov't of British Columbia, Submission to The House of Commons Sub-Committee on International Trade, Trade Disputes, and Investment regarding the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Nov. 26, 1997) (on file with author).
174. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pts. I-IV. 175. Under NAFTA, Canada reserved "the right to adopt or maintain any measure denying investors of another Party and their investments, or service providers of another Party, any rights or preferences provided to aboriginal parties." NAFTA, supra note 9, 32 I.L.M. at 749.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to show that a range of Guatemalan Government policies on land, stemming from commitments contained in the peace accords, could conflict with broad notions of investor treatment and protection under an FTAA. At the very least, investorse.g., landowners, agribusiness companies, and resource development firms-could challenge all of the prospective reforms outlined above by strategically resorting to an FTAA investor-to-state claim, 17 6 It may be that not all of the investor arguments I have outlined would be successful before an international arbitration panel. In many cases, however, they would not have to be. The mere threat of an investor challenge would no doubt cause a Guatemalan government, facing costly litigation and the prospect of a substantial damages award, to think twice before pursuing errant policies. It is this climate of risk, in the face of the uncertainty generated under an FTAA, that would effectively increase the weight afforded to the priorities of investors relative to other social groups in the process of political decisionmaking that surrounds implementation of the peace accords. It may be, in fact, that an overarching purpose of the FTAA is to insure that the process of reform and democratization in Guatemala does not get out of hand from an investor's point of view, regardless of any consequent smothering of the peace accords.
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These observations go to the heart of criticisms of the new push for higher standards of investor protection. Critics have argued that investment agreements like the NAFTA and the draft MAI will prevent elected governments from pursuing legitimate policies in the public interest. According to Ricardo Grinspun and Robert Kreklewich, the real purpose of "free trade" is to apply a long-term "conditioning framework" to the policy options available to governments, and to "lock in" neoliberal reforms.
177 Further, the "essence of this new conditionality" is "to restrict choice at the national level and to impose policies against the will of people, but in a disguised manner." 17 8
76
Some proponents of stronger investor protection outwardly express their intention to reduce the policy options available to future elected 176. According to one commentary on the draft MAI, an investor-to-state mechanism "is likely to result in investors carefully scrutinizing government practices to find a MAI provision on which they can base a claim." Appleton. supra note 109, para. 24.
177. A conditioning framework is "an institutional mechanism that effectively restricts policy choices at the nation-state level," which "becomes binding due to international constraints and obligations incurred to another country, to foreign corporations, foreign investors, or to a multilateral agency." Grinspun & Kreklewich, supra note 95, at 36. Free trade agreements represent a "higher level" of constraint, on top of other formal constraints such as the imposition of IMF conditionality in the context of debt crisis. One important difference between the two is that IMF conditionality is usually temporary (3-5 years), whereas free trade agreements are intended to be permanent. Id. at 39, 41. 178. Id. at 40. governments in the face of a liberalized hemispheric economy. The Latin American Economic System (SELA), for example, has commented that the trend toward the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in Latin America "has contributed to 'lock' the adopted reforms inasmuch as their reversal is now more difficult."1 7 9 SELA also reports that an FTAA investment agreement "could play an important role for governments" by acting as "a deterrent to [future governments] later making changes in the liberalization process." 18 0
Thus, although framed in the narrow context of the rules of 77 international investment, the full impact of an FTAA investment agreement extends deep into the realm of public policy. According to Grinspun and Kreklewich, "[t] he new trading arrangements effectively remove many economic and social policy objectives from democratic consideration," and " [t] he outcome, if unchallenged, will be a narrower set of societal choices; an unprecedented entrenchment of barriers to progressive social change." 1 81 Along these lines, a committee created by the British Columbia provincial government to study the draft MAI concluded that signing the agreement "would be an unacceptable, even reckless, surrender of sovereignty and democratic control."' 1 8 2 In all countries, therefore, the "free trade" debate is really about the nature of society and democracy. With respect to Guatemala, should foreign investors and their counterparts among local elites have access to international avenues where they can resist state-directed reforms authorized by the peace accords? What, in essence, is the appropriate scope of democratic governance?
There is no doubt that progressively-minded Guatemalan 78 governments (as rare as they are) have long faced constraints on their policy options stemming from the country's economic dependence on international markets, intervention by external actors, and the extreme internal concentration of power, among other factors. 18 3 In the past, the U.S. Government, in particular, has thwarted attempts at reform in Guatemala in cases where they were viewed as harmful to the interests of American investors.
18 4 Perhaps the starkest example is the role the U.S. played in toppling the Arbenz government in 1954, after its initiation of a broad program of land reform. 185 It is telling that the U.S. intervention was prompted in large part by claims that the United Fruit Company had not received adequate compensation for the expropriation of some of its lands.
18 6 Today, American investors remain the largest source of FDI in the country "by far," according to the U.S. Department of Commerce,1 8 7 and one wonders how much their essential interests have changed.
.9
Within Guatemala itself, domestic elites have historically allied themselves with foreign interests in order to reinforce their control of the state and resist reform.' 88 For these groups, one of the primary goals of the peace process has been to facilitate further integration into the global economy by providing greater security for foreign investors.
8 9 Today's agenda shares certain aspects of previous elite strategies to expand and intensify export production, and encourage foreign investment.190 Paul Dosal describes the current Guatemalan elite in this way:
The neoliberals are industrialists, agro-exporters, bankers, and professionals, a breed of entrepreneurs who distinguish themselves from the landed oligarchy in their commitment to a degree of democratization and their willingness to consider a nonmilitary solution to the civil war. They are, nevertheless, oligarchs, with a vested interest in the maintenance of a system in which wealth and power is inequitably distributed .... 191
In terms of the FTAA, therefore, Guatemala's elite is more likely to 80 support, rather than oppose, the restraints that stronger investor protection would place on the potential for broad-ranging reform under the peace accords. 192 The popular response to the FTAA, on the other hand, should be the 81 same as in the case of the peace accords themselves: to seek to enhance opportunities for greater democratic accountability and progressive change in the future. 193 The first step is to attempt to identify and understand the potential implications of an FTAA and to nurture alternative visions of integration in the Americas. 194 Thus, for instance, 190 . As has been noted, it was "a goal considered desirable by all Central American leaders in the nineteenth century" to "integrate the region into the world economy." BULMER-THOMAS, supra note 24, at 1.
191. DosAL, supra note 189, at 192. Palencia Prado & Holiday offer the following description of Guatemalan elite:
The conception of modernization that predominates in the private sector is that of freeing the market to the greatest extent possible from state intervention and regulation. The idea is for the government to withdraw from activities that are profitable for the private sector and provide tax exemptions and other investment incentives. PALENCIA PRADO & HOLIDAY, supra note 12, at 6. 192 . In the area of tax reform, for instance, Guatemala's private sector has successfully blocked every attempt at reform in the last decade, even though Guatemala has the lowest tax revenues in the hemisphere-under 8 percent, compared to the regional norm of 18 percent. See Holiday, supra note 57, at 70.
193. According to Grinspun and Kreklewich, progressive activists: must articulate the means by which FTAs transfer significant powers to unelected and unaccountable bodies and institutions, and give the highest guarantees of expression to the rights and freedoms of transnational capital. The rhetoric of "globalization" must be unmasked as it is invoked to deny similar countervailing rights and freedoms to community-based organizations, associations, and unions. Grinspun & Kreklewich, supra note 95, at 54. 194 . Cuauhtmoc CArdenas, a prominent leader of the Mexican Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the mayor of Mexico City, has called for an alternative Trade and Development Pact in North America that would utilize managed trade as a tool for development, and would include provisions on labor mobility, compensatory financing for less developed regions, and a social charter that would promote harmonization of social, labor, and environmental standards to the highest common denominator. See Grinspun & Cameron, supra note 88, at 19. a truly comprehensive legal framework to govern hemispheric investment flows should provide stable and predictable rules not only for the protection of investors, but also for the legitimate exercise of state regulation of FDI.
19 5 At the very least, it should include specific and clear wording to explicitly limit the application of principles of investor protection in cases where the risk of constraining legitimate democratic choices is simply too great. 196 In the case of Guatemala, I have identified concerns regarding the ability of future governments to carry out commitments on land under the peace accords. Similar concerns could be raised with respect to a host of other issues, in every country. As in most cases, the journey toward a transnational civil society begins quite close to home. 197 195. UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 133, 166. Rules regarding permissible state regulation might include, inter alia, policies on employment, protection of the environment, consumer protection, information disclosure, technology transfer, transfer pricing and taxation, bribery, and restrictive business practices. See Ganesan, supra note 94, at 4-5.
Mexican civil society organizations have taken the position, in the context of NAFTA, that foreign investment "needs to be regulated by the State so that it may play a positive role in national development" and that expropriations should be compensated "according to timing and value established under Mexican law and in the national currency." RED MEXICANA DE AccION FRENTE AL LIBRE COMERCIO, ESPEJISMO Y REALIDAD: EL TLCAN TRES AIos DESPUtS 177-78 (1997) .
196. Regarding the content of the FTAA itself, nongovernmental groups from the Americas have submitted 72 proposals to the Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Civil society groups presented a letter to the FTAA investment working group on April 19, 1999, stating that they wished "to inform governments early in the negotiating process that civil society will oppose efforts to write an MAI or NAFTA-style investment agreement for the Western Hemisphere through the FTAA." The letter expressed concern about the impact of an investment agreement on "democratic procedures, economic development, financial stability, environmental protection, and human rights," and stated that civil society organization opposed "binding investor-to-state arbitration rules as the centerpiece of an FTAA investment agreement" as "a closed avenue by which corporations can bypass normal political and legal channels and attack domestically enacted laws." See The FTAA Process, BRIDGES BETWEEN TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (ICTSD), Apr. 1999, at 10, available at <http://www.ictsd.org/html]arctsd.htm>.
197. "Transnational civil society" is the forum for "globalization-from-below," described by Falk as "an array of transnational social forces animated by environmental concerns, human rights, hostility to patriarchy, and a vision of human community based on the unity of diverse cultures seeking an end to poverty, oppression, humiliation, and collective violence." Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS 39, 39 (J. Becher et al. eds, 1993) .
